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Abstract
We provide a syntactic model of unawareness. By introducing multiple knowledge modalities,
one for each sub-language, we specifically model agents whose only mistake in reasoning (other
than their unawareness) is to underestimate the knowledge of more aware agents. We show that
the model is a complete and sound axiomatization of the set-theoretic model of Galanis [2007]
and compare it with other unawareness models in the literature.
JEL-Classifications: C70, C72, D80, D82.
Keywords: unawareness, uncertainty, knowledge, interactive epistemology, modal logic,
bounded perception.
1 Introduction
An agent who is unaware lacks not only information, that is, answers to his questions, but,
more importantly, he has a limited perception of the uncertainty he faces. In other words,
he completely misses some of the relevant questions. This implies that there may be some
pieces of information that the agent does not know, and at the same he does not know
that he does not know. A less obvious implication of unawareness is that if the answers to
questions are connected through theorems, then being unaware of these theorems implies
that the knowledge of the other agents may be underestimated.
A short example illustrates the last point. Suppose that agent j is only aware of the
statement “the price is high” and that the price will be determined tomorrow. In other
words, it is simply not possible for anyone to know whether prices are high or low, if he
is only aware of prices. Hence, agent j concludes that, in his awareness, i does not know
whether the price is high. But suppose that agent i is also aware of the statement “the
interest rate is low” and that there is a logical connection specifying that a low interest rate
implies a high price. Agent i concludes that, in his awareness, he knows that the price is
high. Although agent j is wrong when reasoning about i’s knowledge, this is only because
he is constrained by his unawareness. Because it is correct that no one can know whether
the price is high if he is unaware of the interest rate, j is not making a mistake within the
∗I am grateful to seminar participants at the 2009 Conference on the Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and
Knowledge (TARK XII) at Stanford.
†Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton, SO17 1BJ,
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bounds of his awareness.1 Moreover, agent j is not irrational in general, that is, he does not
make any other mistakes in his reasoning.
The paper provides a syntactic model of unawareness that isolates and captures this
mistake of reasoning. Moreover, we show that it is a complete and sound axiomatization of
the set-theoretic model of Galanis [2007]. The approach we use follows that of Heifetz et al.
[2008a] (HMS from now on), of constructing a canonical unawareness structure. Finally, we
compare the present model with that of HMS.
Although set-theoretic models about knowledge are prevalent in economics, syntactic
models are in fact more transparent, both in terms of the assumptions they make and in
terms of specifying the beliefs of the agents.2 As a result, it is more straightforward to
compare two approaches by looking at their syntactic representations, rather than their set-
theoretic ones. In fact, such a comparison has already been made for most of the papers in
the literature. By comparing the present model with that of HMS, we are able to determine
its place in the literature.
In order to illustrate the difference between the present and other approaches, we need
to distinguish between a language and a sub-language. When modeling knowledge using
a syntactic approach, the modeler starts with a set of primitive propositions, consisting of
statements like “it rains” or “the price is high”. Using negation (¬), conjunction (∧) and
the knowledge modality ki, a language is created, containing all the well formed formulas.
Moreover, it is implicitly assumed that all agents have a perfect understanding of that
language. For example, the formula “agent i knows that it rains” is equally understood by
everyone. However, if we introduce unawareness, this may not be true.
Modica and Rustichini [1999] and HMS specify that apart from the universal language
that is generated from all primitive propositions, there are also several sub-languages, each
generated by some of the primitive propositions. An agent who is aware only of some prim-
itive propositions describes the world using one sub-language, which may be very different
from the sub-language used by another agent. Moreover, the agents may not comprehend
or be unaware of other sub-languages.
Suppose there are two agents, each using a different sub-language, both containing the
statement “the price is high”. It is clear that both agents understand “prices” in the same
way. For example, they can write contracts or bet on prices. However, does this imply
that the statement “agent i knows that the price is high” is also understood in the same
way by both agents? In other words, is knowledge when described in one sub-language
identical to knowledge when described in another sub-language? In HMS and other papers
in the literature the answer is “yes”, so there is only one, objective, knowledge modality. In
Galanis [2007] and in this paper we allow for the knowledge modality to be different across
sub-languages. This captures the idea that agents of different perception (awareness) may
reason differently about the knowledge of others.
One way of modeling this mistake in reasoning and the example, within the standard
setting of a unique knowledge modality, is to drop the truth axiom, (kjφ → φ), which says
that if j knows something then it is true. However, in this way we allow agents to be totally
1Agent j could also reason that i knows about prices just because he is smarter or more aware than him. Although
this is allowed by the model, j cannot always make this claim, because then he will never be able to say that i does
not know something. Hence, we also want to allow and capture the case where j mistakenly deduces that i does not
know.
2See Aumann [1999] and Fagin et al. [1995] for a comparison of the two approaches.
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irrational and to make all kinds of mistakes, even unrelated to unawareness.
In order to avoid this extra irrationality we introduce one knowledge modality, kiα, for
each sub-language which is generated by a set α of primitive propositions. Moreover, we
impose the truth axiom for each knowledge modality (kiαφ → φ) and we add an axiom
saying that more complete sub-languages give a better description of knowledge. Formally,
if α ⊆ α′ then kiαφ → kiα′φ. Therefore, agent j can make a mistake about i’s knowledge
only if his sub-language is not more complete than i’s sub-language. For example, we can
simultaneously have ¬kiαφ and kiα′φ only if α′ is not a subset of α.3 Moreover, since the truth
axiom holds for every sub-language, this is the only mistake in reasoning that any agent is
allowed to make.
For instance, suppose j knows φ, so that kjαφ is true. If φ is the statement “it rains” then
it is true that it rains. But if φ is the statement ¬kiαφ′, then although ¬kiαφ′ is also true,
it may be that because agent i’s sub-language is α′ (and α ⊂ α′) we also have that kiα′φ′ is
true. Hence, i knows φ′ and j essentially makes a mistake about i’s knowledge. Allowing
both kiα′φ
′ and kiαφ
′ to be true refers to the case where it is not possible to know φ′ when
being aware only of sub-language α, whereas it is possible to know φ′ when being aware of
the richer sub-language α′.
Summarizing, although one could argue that an “awareness leads to knowledge” effect is
better captured in a dynamic environment, it has significant implications in a static model
as well. As was described above, if two agents differ only in that one is more aware than the
other, then the more aware agent would have more knowledge. Moreover, the less aware agent
would mistakenly think that their knowledge is the same. This can be captured by relaxing
the truth axiom in the standard model but then all possible mistakes (even unrelated to
unawareness) are allowed. The other possibility is introducing multiple knowledge modalities,
as described above.
A few clarifications are in order. First, since there are many knowledge modalities, which
is the one that provides the true description of the agent’s knowledge? This depends on the
agent’s sub-language, which is determined by his awareness. Consequently, when agent i
reasons about j’s knowledge, he first has to reason about j’s awareness and sub-language.
Second, we do not allow for false certainties. In other words, it is never the case that an
agent knows a formula which is false. This is due to the truth axiom. At the same time,
we allow agents to make statements which, from another agent’s point of view with a richer
awareness, are mistaken. We say that agent i makes a mistake in his reasoning about j if,
for example, he is aware only of primitive propositions in α and knows that j is aware of α,
he knows that ¬kjαφ and yet it is true that kjα′φ and agent j is aware of all propositions in
α′, where α ⊂ α′. Because ¬kjαφ is also true, the truth axiom is not violated. Moreover, i
is not making a mistake when reasoning that j’s awareness is α, when in fact it is α′. The
reason is that i is only aware of primitive propositions in α, so he cannot reason above that
level.
Comparing the present axiom system with that of HMS, we find two main differences.
First, whereas in HMS knowledge in one sub-language is equivalent to knowledge in any
other sub-language, here it only implies knowledge in more complete sub-languages.4 Sec-
3In the example, i’s sub-language is generated by primitive propositions in α′ and j’s sub-language is generated
by α.
4The syntax of the two papers is not same. However, we are able to map the syntax of HMS to the syntax of the
present paper in a natural way, so that the comparison of the axioms is meaningful.
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ond, because in the present paper knowledge differs across sub-languages, the knowledge
modalities “carry” awareness. For example, being aware of formula kiαφ implies awareness of
all propositions in α and is not equivalent to being aware of kiβφ. This is not true in HMS,
because there is only one knowledge modality. Hence, adapted to the syntax of the present
paper, the axiom system of HMS specifies that awareness of kiαφ only implies awareness of
all primitive propositions that generate φ, and it is equivalent to awareness of kiβφ. This
second difference implies, as we show in the following section, that the axiom system of HMS
is neither weaker nor stronger than the axiom system of this paper.
Fagin and Halpern [1988] provide the first model of unawareness and introduce an explicit
awareness operator, as is the case with the present paper. Modica and Rustichini [1994,
1999], Dekel et al. [1998] and HMS define awareness in terms of knowledge. Both HMS
and Halpern and Reˆgo [2008] provide sound and complete axiomatizations of Heifetz et al.
[2006], hence they are equivalent. Moreover, they are multi agent generalizations of Modica
and Rustichini [1999] and Halpern [2001], respectively, which are also equivalent. HMS is
also equivalent to a multi agent version of a sub-class of unawareness structures described in
Fagin and Halpern [1988].5 Board and Chung [2007] provide a model of unawareness using
first order modal logic.
Heifetz et al. [2006], Li [2008] and Galanis [2007] construct set-theoretic models of un-
awareness using multiple state spaces. On the other hand, Geanakoplos [1989], Ely [1998]
and Xiong [2007] employ the standard framework of a unique state space. Dekel et al. [1998]
argue that if unawareness satisfies three plausible properties, then a standard state space
can only accommodate trivial unawareness.
Games with unawareness are analyzed by Feinberg [2004, 2005], Cˇopicˇ and Galeotti
[2007], Li [2006b], Sadzik [2006], Heifetz et al. [2007], Heifetz et al. [2008b] and Halpern and
Reˆgo [2006]. Applications with unawareness have been provided by Modica et al. [1998],
Ewerhart [2001], Galanis [2008], Filiz-Ozbay [2008], Ozbay [2008], von Thadden and Zhao
[2008] and Zhao [2008].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the syntax and the axiom system and
compares it to that of HMS. In section 3 we define the unawareness structures and in section
4 we construct the canonical structure. Soundness and completeness are demonstrated in
section 5. All proofs are included in the appendix.
2 Syntax and axiom system
Let X be the set of primitive propositions, and let I be the set of individuals. The syntax
we use involves the usual modalities ¬, ∧ and the unusual modalities kiα and aiα, where
α ⊆ X. That is, instead of the “objective” knowledge and awareness modalities ki and ai,
we introduce one for each subset α of the set of primitive propositions.
Given a sequence of primitive propositions and modalities, φ, let Pr(φ) be the set of
primitive propositions contained in φ.6 More precisely,
• Pr(>) = ∅,
5For more details on the relationships between these papers, see HMS and Halpern and Reˆgo [2008].
6The definition of Pr suggests that modalities like kiα and a
i
α are also considered “primitive propositions”. For
example, we can have Pr(kiαφ) = α ) Pr(φ). HMS also define a Pr function, but their definition is different. We
elaborate on the differences in the next section.
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• Pr(x) = {x}, for x ∈ X,
• Pr(¬φ) = Pr(φ),
• Pr(φ ∧ ψ) = Pr(φ) ∪ Pr(ψ),
• Pr(kiαφ) = Pr(φ) ∪ α,
• Pr(aiαφ) = Pr(φ) ∪ α.
The set of formulas L is the smallest set such that:
• > is a formula,
• every x ∈ X is a formula,
• if φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula,
• if φ and ψ are formulas, then φ ∧ ψ is a formula,
• if φ is a formula and Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ X, then aiαφ and kiαφ are formulas.
Call L the “universal” language. Given a subset α ∈ X, define the sub-language Lα :=
{φ ∈ L : Pr(φ) ⊆ α}, which consists of the formulas and the knowledge and awareness
modalities containing only primitive propositions in α.
Consider the following axiom system.
• All substitution instances of valid formulas of Propositional Calculus including the
formula >, (PC),
• the inference rule Modus Ponens:
φ, φ→ ψ
ψ
, (MP)
For Pr(φ), P r(ψ) ⊆ β ⊆ α ⊆ X,
• the Axiom of Truth:
kiαφ→ φ, (T)
• the Axiom of Positive Introspection:
kiαφ ∧
x∈β
aiαx ∧
y∈α\β
¬aiαy → kiαkiβφ, (4)
• the Axiom of Negative Introspection :
aiαφ ∧
x∈β
aiαx→ kiαφ ∨ kiα(¬kiβφ ∧ aiβφ), (5)
• the Propositional Awareness Axioms:
1. aiαφ↔ aiα¬φ,
2. aiαφ ∧ aiαψ ↔ aiα(φ ∧ ψ),
3. aiαk
j
βφ↔ ∧
x∈β
aiαx, for j ∈ I,
4. aiαa
j
βφ↔ ∧
x∈β
aiαx, for j ∈ I.
(PA)
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• the inference rule RK-Inference: For all natural numbers n ≥ 1 : If φ1, φ2, . . . , φn and
φ are formulas such that Pr(φ) ⊆ Uni=1Pr(φi) ⊆ α ⊆ X then
φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn → φ
kiαφ1 ∧ . . . ∧ kiαφn → kiαφ
. (RK)
• For Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′ ⊆ X,
kiαφ→ aiαφ, (A)
aiαφ↔ aiα′φ, (AA)
kiαφ→ kiα′φ. (KA)
Axioms PC and MP are standard and need no explanation. Axioms T,4 and 5 are adapted
versions of the following familiar axioms:
kiφ→ φ,
kiφ→ kikiφ,
kiφ ∨ ki¬kiφ.
The main difference is that these axioms are expressed in a syntax with more than one
knowledge modality. Hence, T says that the truth axiom holds for all knowledge modalities.
Axiom 4 says that if, within the sub-language generated by primitive propositions in α, the
agent knows φ and he is aware only of primitive propositions in β, then he knows that he
knows φ, where “he knows φ” is expressed in the sub-language generated by β. Note that
the sub-language generated by α cannot express awareness of a primitive proposition outside
α. Axiom 5 specifies that being aware of φ and all primitive propositions in β implies that
either he knows φ, or that he knows that, within the sub-language generated by β, he does
not know it and he is aware of it.
Axioms PA1 and PA2 are used in Modica and Rustichini [1999] and in HMS but here
they are extended for all awareness modalities of all sub-languages. Axiom PA3 specifies
that agent i is aware that, within the sub-language generated by β, agent j knows φ, if and
only if i is aware of all primitive propositions in β. This Axiom is similar to the PA3 Axiom
of HMS: aiφ ↔ aikjφ, for j ∈ I. However, as we discuss in the following section, neither
is weaker or stronger than the other. Axiom PA4 has similar intuition.7 RK-Inference is
similar to the RK-Inference rule introduced by HMS. There are two differences. First, the
Pr function here is different from the Pr function in HMS. We elaborate on this difference
in the following section. Second, the rule here applies to all permitted knowledge modalities.
Axiom A specifies that knowledge implies awareness.
The last two Axioms specify when awareness and knowledge in one sub-language translate
to awareness and knowledge to another sub-language. Axiom AA says that awareness of a
formula φ in a sub-language generated by α implies awareness of φ in all sub-languages which
are either more or less complete and can express φ. Axiom KA specifies that knowledge of
φ in a sub-language generated by α implies knowledge of φ only in sub-languages which are
more complete. This last axiom essentially relaxes the condition that there is one, objective,
7HMS do not have a PA4 Axiom, as they define awareness as aiφ := kiφ∨ki¬kiφ, whereas here the only connection
between the awareness and knowledge modalities is through the axioms.
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knowledge modality, that transcends all sub-languages, as in HMS and other papers in the
literature.
The following definitions are standard and taken from HMS.
Definition 1. The set of theorems is the smallest set of formulas that contain all the axioms
and that is closed under the inference rules Modus Ponens and RK-Inference.
Definition 2. Let Γ be a set of formulas and φ a formula. A proof of φ from Γ is a finite
sequence of formulas such that the last formula is φ and such that each formula is a formula
in Γ, a theorem of the system or inferred from the previous formulas by Modus Ponens. If
there is a proof of φ from Γ, then we write Γ ` φ. In particular, ` φ means that φ is a
theorem. If Γ ` φ, we say that Γ implies φ syntactically.
Definition 3. A set of formulas is consistent if and only if there is no formula φ such that
Γ ` φ and Γ ` ¬φ. A set Γ of formulas is inconsistent, if it is not consistent.
2.1 Relation to the axiom system of HMS
In this section we compare the present axiom system with that of HMS. The main difficulty
is that the syntax of the two approaches is different. In particular, whereas HMS have
one knowledge modality ki and one awareness modality ai, the syntax of the present paper
contains several knowledge and awareness modalities, kiα, a
i
α, one for each subset α ⊆ X of
primitive propositions.
We can only have a meaningful comparison if the syntax is the same. This can be achieved
if we interpret ki, ai in the HMS syntax as the modalities kiX , a
i
X , respectively, in the syntax
of this paper, where X is the set of all primitive propositions. Moreover, we add to the
axiom system of HMS two axioms specifying that all knowledge and awareness modalities
are the “same”. That is, if Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′ ⊆ X, we have kiαφ ↔ kiα′φ and aiαφ ↔ aiα′φ.
HMS define the awareness modality as aiφ := kiφ ∨ ki¬kiφ. We incorporate this definition
as an axiom in their axiom system.
Finally, the definition of the function Pr in HMS is different from the definition here.
Adapted to the syntax of the present paper, Pr in HMS requires that Pr(kαφ) = Pr(φ),
whereas here it requires that Pr(kαφ) = Pr(φ)∪α. This difference matters for the definition
of RK-Inference. To distinguish between the two, we denote as Pr′ the function Pr of HMS.
Summarizing, the HMS axiom system, adapted to the syntax of the present paper and
with the addition of the aforementioned axioms, takes the following form. We denote similar
axioms with a ′.
• Axioms (PC), (MP),
• the Axiom of Truth:
kiXφ→ φ, (T′)
• the Axiom of Positive Introspection:
kiXφ→ kiXkiXφ, , (4′)
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• the Propositional Awareness Axioms:
1. aiXφ↔ aiX¬φ,
2. aiXφ ∧ aiXψ ↔ aiX(φ ∧ ψ),
3. aiXφ↔ aiXkjXφ, for j ∈ I.
(PA′)
• the inference rule RK-Inference: For all natural numbers n ≥ 1 : If φ1, φ2, . . . , φn and
φ are formulas such that Pr′(φ) ⊆ Uni=1Pr′(φi) then
φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn → φ
kiXφ1 ∧ . . . ∧ kiXφn → kiXφ
. (RK′)
For Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′ ⊆ X,8
aiαφ↔ aiα′φ, (AA)
kiαφ↔ kiα′φ, (KA′)
aiXφ↔ kiXφ ∨ kiX¬kiXφ. (D)
The first difference between the two axiom systems is that KA′ is relaxed to KA. That
is, whereas in HMS there is effectively only one knowledge operator that transcends all
sub-languages, in the present axiom system knowledge in one sub-language only implies
knowledge in more complete sub-languages.
The second difference is that in the HMS system knowledge and awareness modalities kiα
and aiα do not “carry” any awareness. It is a theorem of the HMS system that being aware
of the formula kiαφ is equivalent to being aware of formula k
i
α′φ, for any α
′ ⊆ X.9 This
is consistent with the premise that there is effectively only one knowledge modality, ki. In
contrast, in the approach of the present paper knowledge operators “carry” awareness, so
that being aware of formula kiαφ does not imply awareness of k
i
α′φ. The difference between
the two approaches is illustrated by Axioms PA3 and PA′3. Although they look similar, it
is not the case that one is weaker than the other.
In particular, PA′3 is not a theorem of the current axiom system. To see this, note that
if this were the case, then aiXφ→ aiXkjXφ and PA3 would imply that whenever i is aware of
a formula φ, he is also aware of all primitive propositions in X. For the same reason, PA3
and PA4 are not theorems of the HMS axiom system.10 As a result, it is not the case that
the present axiom system is either weaker or stronger than the HMS axiom system.
The following proposition shows that the remaining axioms are theorems of the HMS
system. Let inference rule RK′′ be the same as RK but adding the qualification that Pr′(φ) ⊆
Uni=1Pr
′(φi).
Proposition 1. Axioms PC, T, 4, 5, PA1, PA2, A, AA, KA and inference rules MP and
RK′′ are derived from the axiom system of HMS.
8Note that we use the Pr function, not the Pr′ one, because we want the two axioms to hold for all knowledge
and awareness modalities that can express formula φ.
9This is derived from the Propositional Awareness Axioms, Lemma 1 in HMS, and the definition of Pr′.
10Another difference is between inference rules RK and RK′, because Pr is not equivalent to Pr′. Pr specifies that
kiα, a
i
α carry awareness, so that Pr(k
i
αφ) = Pr(φ)∪α, whereas Pr′ specifies that they do not, so that Pr(kiαφ) = Pr(φ).
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3 Unawareness structures
We first present an overview of the model developed in Galanis [2007]. Consider a complete
lattice of disjoint state spaces S = {Sa}a∈A and denote by Σ = ∪a∈ASa the union of these
state spaces. A state ω is an element of some state space S. Let S∗ be the most complete
state space, the join of all state spaces in S. We call S∗ the full state space. An element
ω∗ ∈ S∗ is called a full state.
Let  be a partial order on S. For any S, S ′ ∈ S, S  S ′ means that S ′ is more expressive
than S. Moreover, there is a surjective projection rS
′
S : S
′ → S. Projections are required
to commute. If S  S ′  S ′′ then rS′′S = rS′S ◦ rS′′S′ . If ω ∈ S ′, denote ωS = rS′S (ω) and
ωS′′ = {ω′ ∈ S ′′ : rS′′S′ (ω′) = ω}. If B ⊆ S ′, denote by BS = {ωS : ω ∈ B} the restriction of B
on S and by BS′′ =
⋃{ωS′′ : ω ∈ B} the enlargement of B on S ′′. Let g(S) = {S ′ : S  S ′}
be the collection of state spaces that are at least as expressive as S. For a set B ⊆ S,
denote by B↑ =
⋃
S′∈g(S) BS′ the enlargements of B to all state spaces which are at least as
expressive as S.
Consider a possibility correspondence P i : Σ→ 2Σ \ ∅ with the following properties:
(0) Confinedness: If ω ∈ S then P i(ω) ⊆ S ′ for some S ′  S.
(1) Generalized Reflexivity: ω ∈ (P i(ω))↑ for every ω ∈ Σ.
(2) Stationarity: ω′ ∈ P i(ω) implies P i(ω′) = P i(ω).
(3) Projections Preserve Awareness: If ω ∈ S ′, ω ∈ P i(ω) and S  S ′ then ωS ∈ P i(ωS).
(4) Projections Preserve Ignorance: If ω ∈ S ′ and S  S ′ then (P i(ω))↑ ⊆ (P i(ωS))↑.
The setting is the same with that of Heifetz et al. [2006]. The first difference is that we
completely take out their Axiom Projections Preserve Knowledge: If S  S ′  S ′′, ω ∈ S ′′
and P i(ω) ⊆ S ′ then (P i(ω))S = P i(ωS). Justification and examples for this omission are
provided in Galanis [2007]. The two other differences concern the definitions of an event and
those of knowledge and awareness.
3.1 Events, awareness and knowledge
Formally, an event is a pair (E, S), where E ⊆ S and S ∈ S. The negation of (E, S), defined
by ¬(E, S) = (S \ E, S), is the complement of E with respect to S. Let E = {(E, S) :
E ⊆ S, S ∈ S} be the set of all events. We write E as a shorthand for (E, S) and ∅S as a
shorthand for (∅, S). For each event E, let S(E) be the state space of which it is a subset.
An event E “inherits” the expressiveness of the state space of which it is a subset. Hence,
we can extend  to a partial order 0 on E in the following way: E 0 E ′ if and only if
S(E)  S(E ′). Abusing notation, we write  instead of 0.
Before defining knowledge, we need to define awareness. For any event E, for any state
space S such that S  E, define
AiS(E) = {ω ∈ S : E  P i(ω)}
to be the event which describes, with the vocabulary of S, that the agent is aware of event
E. The agent is aware of an event whenever his possibility set resides in a state space that is
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rich enough to express event E. Unawareness is defined as the negation of awareness. More
formally, the event U iS(E) describes, with the vocabulary of S, that the agent is unaware of
E:
U iS(E) = ¬AiS(E) = (S \ AiS(E), S).
Let Ωi : Σ → S be such that for any ω ∈ Σ, Ωi(ω) = S if and only if P i(ω) ⊆ S. Ωi(ω)
denotes the agent’s state space at ω. An agent knows an event E if he is aware of it and in
all the states he considers possible, E is true. Formally, for any event E and for any state
space S such that S  E, define
KiS(E) = {ω ∈ AiS(E) : P i(ω) ⊆ EΩi(ω)}.
An unawareness structure is defined to be, as in HMS, the tuple
Σ =
〈
(Sα)α∈A ,
(
rSαSβ
)
SβSα
,
(
P i
)
i∈I
〉
.
4 The canonical structure
Recall that, given a subset α ∈ X, Lα = {φ ∈ L : Pr(φ) ⊆ α} is the sub-language generated
by the set α of primitive propositions. Given α ⊆ X, define Ωα to be the set of maximally
consistent sets ωα of formulas in Lα. Let Ω = ∪α⊆XΩα be the collection of all state spaces
and define Ωβ  Ωα whenever β ⊆ α. If Ωβ  Ωα then the projection rαβ : Ωα → Ωβ is
defined as rαβ (ω) := ω ∩Lβ. From Proposition 3 and Remark 2 of HMS, the projection rαβ is
well defined and surjective, and α ⊇ β ⊇ γ implies rαγ = rβγ ◦ rαβ .
Given a formula φ and a subset α ⊇ Pr(φ), [φ]Ωα := {ω ∈ Ωα : φ ∈ ω} is an event, as it
is a subset of state space Ωα.
Definition 4. For ω ∈ Ωα, α ⊆ X and i ∈ I, set
P i(ω) :=
{
ω′ ∈ Ω : For every formula φ i) k
i
αφ ∈ ω implies φ ∈ ω′
ii) aiαφ ∈ ω iff (φ ∈ ω′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′)
}
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Proposition 2. For every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Σ, P i(ω) is nonempty and satisfies properties 0-4.
Corollary 1. The tuple
Ω =
〈
(Ωα)α⊆X ,
(
rαβ
)
β⊆α⊆X ,
(
P i
)
i∈I
〉
,
is an unawareness structure.
Moreover, as the following lemma shows, knowledge and awareness can interchangeably
be described syntactically or as an event.
Lemma 1. Suppose that φ ∈ L and Pr(φ) ⊆ β ⊆ α ⊆ X. Then,
[¬φ]Ωα = ¬[φ]Ωα ,
11Note that kiαφ, a
i
αφ are defined only if Pr(φ) ⊆ α.
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[φ ∧ ψ]Ωα = [φ]Ωα ∩ [ψ]Ωα ,
[kiβφ]Ωα =
(
KiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ))
)
Ωα
,
[aiβφ]Ωα =
(
AiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ))
)
Ωα
.
Given a formula φ, a state ω ∈ Ωα contains a sequence of knowledge modalities kiα′φ,
where α′ is such that Pr(φ) ⊆ α′ ⊆ α. Which one of the knowledge modalities is the “true”
description of i’s knowledge of φ? This depends on i’s awareness. If ω specifies that i is
aware only of primitive propositions in α′ ⊆ α, then his sub-language is Ωα′ and he knows φ
if kiα′φ ∈ ω.
It is important to stress that Ωα, as a description of i’s knowledge, can be quite restrictive.
The reason is that agent i may be aware of a primitive proposition x which does not belong
to α. As a result, sub-language Ωα is not complete enough to express awareness of x. But
more importantly, in that case Ωα is also not complete enough to express i’s knowledge of
φ as well. In particular, if α′′ = α ∪ {x} then the modality kiα′′φ is better suited to describe
i’s knowledge. But it does not belong to the sub-language Lα, so it is not part of any state
in Ωα.
According to the axiom system, a less complete sub-language can only underestimate
one’s knowledge, not overestimate it. In particular, suppose that kiαφ ∈ ω and ∧
x∈α
aiαx ∈ ω
so that i knows φ, according to ω. Because of Axiom KA, it must be that kiα′′φ ∈ ω′ for any
ω′ ∈ Ωα′′ that projects to ω, where α ⊂ α′′. On the other hand, if ¬kiαφ ∈ ω we may have
kiα′′φ ∈ ω′ or ¬kiα′′φ ∈ ω′. Hence, more complete state spaces give a better description of
one’s knowledge.
Summarizing, it may be that ω′ specifies that agent i knows φ, whereas the projection of
ω′ to a lower state space specifies that he does not know φ. This is the Awareness Leads to
Knowledge property, proposed in Galanis [2007]. The intuition behind this property is that
the projection belongs to a state space which is generated by a less complete sub-language,
hence containing fewer knowledge modalities kiα′φ, which may underestimate i’s knowledge.
This property is not true in HMS, effectively because there is only one knowledge modality,
ki.
5 Soundness and completeness
Recall that E = {E ⊆ S : S ∈ S} is the collection of all events and let E↑ := {E↑ : E ∈ E}
be the collection of extended events. A typical element of E↑ consists of an event E ⊆ S
and all of its enlargements to higher state spaces ES′ , where S  S ′. For a given set of
primitive propositions X, let v : X → E↑ be the evaluation function. The extended event
v(x) contains all events where the primitive proposition x obtains. An unawareness model
is a pair Σv := (Σ, v). Abusing notation, we write Σ for an unawareness model, instead of
Σv. Let C : S → 2X denote which primitive propositions in X occur in state space S. That
is, define, for each S ∈ S, C(S) := ⋃{x ∈ X : E ∈ v(x), E ⊆ S}. We assume that if S 6= S ′
then C(S) 6= C(S ′). Given any set α ⊆ X, let C−1(α) := ∧{S ∈ S : α ⊆ C(S)} be the least
complete state space where all primitive propositions in α occur.
We first specify what it means for a formula φ to be defined at a particular state ω.
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Definition 5. For a nonempty set X and a set of players I, let (Σ, v) be an unawareness
model, and let ω ∈ S for some S ∈ S. Then we define by induction on the formation of the
formulas in L:
• (Σ, ω) 7→ >, for all ω ∈ Σ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ x, if ω ∈ E ∈ E↑ = v(x),
• (Σ, ω) 7→ φ ∧ ψ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ φ and (Σ, ω) 7→ ψ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ ¬φ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ φ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ aiαφ, if Pr(φ) ⊆ α = C(S ′), S ′  S, and (Σ, ω) 7→ φ,
• (Σ, ω) 7→ kiαφ, if Pr(φ) ⊆ α = C(S ′), S ′  S, and (Σ, ω) 7→ φ.
Definition 6. Say that a formula φ is defined at state ω ∈ S ∈ S of unawareness model Σ
if (Σ, ω) 7→ φ.
Note that kiαφ, a
i
αφ are defined at state ω ∈ S only if the set of primitive propositions α
corresponds to a state space S ′ (C(S ′) = α) that is less complete than S. In that way, we
get a one to one correspondence between the knowledge (awareness) modality kiα (a
i
α) and
the knowledge (awareness) operator KiC−1(α) (A
i
C−1(α)). As the following definition shows,
the negation of a formula is true if it is defined but not true.
Definition 7. For a nonempty set X and a set of players I, let (Σ, v) be an unawareness
model, and let ω ∈ S for some S ∈ S. Then we define by induction on the formation of the
formulas in L:
• (Σ, ω) |= >, for all ω ∈ Σ,
• (Σ, ω) |= x, if ω ∈ E ∈ E↑ = v(x),
• (Σ, ω) |= φ ∧ ψ, if (Σ, ω) |= φ and (Σ, ω) |= ψ,
• (Σ, ω) |= ¬φ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ ¬φ and not (Σ, ω) |= φ ,
• (Σ, ω) |= aiαφ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ aiαφ and {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))),
• (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ, if (Σ, ω) 7→ kiαφ and {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))),
where, given a formula ψ and S ∈ S such that (Σ, ω) 7→ ψ for some ω ∈ S, [ψ]S := {ω ∈ S :
(Σ, ω) |= ψ}. Moreover, ¬[ψ]S is the complement with respect to S.
The following definitions are standard.
Definition 8. We say that φ is true in state ω if (Σ, ω) |= φ. For a set of formulas Γ, we
say that Γ is true in state ω if (Σ, ω) |= φ, for all φ ∈ Γ.
Definition 9. For Γ ⊆ L, we say that Γ has a model if there is an unawareness model Σ
and a state ω ∈ Σ such that (Σ, ω) |= Γ.
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Definition 10. Let Σ be an unawareness model. If Γ is a set of formulas and φ is a formula,
we write Γ |=Σ φ if whenever φ is defined at state ω ∈ S we have that (Σ, ω) |= Γ implies
(Σ, ω) |= φ.
Definition 11. We write Γ |= φ if for every unawareness model Σ we have Γ |=Σ φ. In this
case, we say that Γ implies φ semantically. Accordingly, we write |= φ if it is the case that
∅ |= φ. We say that φ is valid, if |= φ.
Definition 12. The system of axioms and inference rules is strongly sound (with respect to
the class of unawareness models) if for every set of formulas Γ and every formula φ we have
that Γ ` φ implies Γ |= φ. It is strongly complete if the reverse holds.
Definition 13. For x ∈ X, define vΩ(x) := {ω ∈ Ω : x ∈ ω}.
Corollary 2. The pair (Ω, vΩ) is an unawareness model such that for all φ ∈ L:
(Ω, ω) |= φ iff φ ∈ ω.
HMS call (Ω, vΩ) the canonical unawareness model. We use it to prove the following
Theorem, which provides the syntactic foundations for the set-theoretic model of Galanis
[2007].
Theorem 1. The system of axioms is strongly sound and complete with respect to the class
of unawareness models.
A Appendix
We use the following inference rules: Conjunction,
φ, ψ
φ ∧ ψ,
and Implication,
φ→ ψ, ψ → χ
φ→ χ .
They are both derived from PC and MP. For details, see HMS.
Proof of Proposition 1. Axiom T is derived from KA′ and T′. For Axiom 4, note that kiαφ→
kiXφ, k
i
Xφ → kiXkiXφ and kiXkiXφ → kiXkiαφ are theorems, because of Axioms KA′, 4′ and
RK′. Similarly, because of KA′ and RK′ we have kiXk
i
αφ→ kiXkiβφ and kiXkiβφ→ kiαkiβφ. By
Implication we have kiαφ→ kiαkiβφ.
For Axiom 5, we have from Axioms D, AA, KA′ and inference rule RK′ that aiαφ →
kiαφ∨kiα¬kiαφ is a theorem. From RK′ and KA′ we have that kiα¬kiαφ→ kiX¬kiαφ, kiX¬kiαφ→
kiX¬kiβφ and kiX¬kiβφ → kiα¬kiβφ are theorems. From Implication, we have that kiα¬kiαφ →
kiα¬kiβφ is a theorem. We then show that kiα¬kiαφ → kiαaiβφ. Note first that aiβφ ↔ kiβφ ∨
kiβ¬kiβφ is a theorem. It then suffices to show (from KA′ and RK′) that kiα¬kiαφ→ kiαkiβφ ∨
kiαk
i
β¬kiβφ is a theorem. Because kiα¬kiαφ → kiα¬kiβφ is a theorem and from Axiom KA′
we have that kiα¬kiαφ → kiβ¬kiβφ is a theorem. Hence, we also have, from RK′ and KA′,
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that kiαk
i
α¬kiαφ → kiαkiβ¬kiβφ is a theorem. From Axioms 4′, KA′ and RK′ we have that
kiα¬kiαφ → kiαkiα¬kiαφ is a theorem. From Implication, kiα¬kiαφ → kiαkiβ¬kiβφ is a theorem.
Finally, kiαk
i
β¬kiβφ→ kiαkiβφ ∨ kiαkiβ¬kiβφ is a theorem.
Axiom A is a theorem from Axioms KA′, AA and D. Axiom AA is also an axiom in HMS.
For Axiom PA1 we have, because of Axioms AA, PA′1, that aiαφ↔ aiXφ↔ aiX¬φ↔ aiα′¬φ.
From Implication, we have the desired result. Similar logic applies for PA2. Axiom KA is
derived from Axiom KA′. Inference rule RK′′ is derived from RK′ and KA′.
Lemma 2. Let Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 be nonempty sets of formulas, each closed under conjunctions, such
that Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3 is inconsistent. Then, there exist φ ∈ Γ1, ψ ∈ Γ2 and χ ∈ Γ3 such that
` φ ∧ ψ → ¬χ.
Proof. See Lemma 7 in HMS.
Lemma 3. Let φ be a formula with Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ X. Then, the following is a theorem:
aiαφ↔
∧
x∈Pr(φ)
aiαx.
Proof. The proof is effectively the same as the proof of Lemma 1 in HMS.
Lemma 4. Let ω ∈ Ωα, α ⊆ X. Then ω is closed under inferences in the following sense:
1. If φ is a theorem such that φ ∈ Lα, then φ ∈ ω.
2. If φ ∈ ω and φ→ ψ is a theorem such that ψ ∈ Lα, then ψ ∈ ω.
3. If φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ω, then
∧n
i=1 φi ∈ ω.
Proof. See Lemma 4 in HMS and Theorem 2.18 in Chellas [1980].
Lemma 5. If Pr(φ) ⊆ α then aiαφ→ kiαaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem.
Proof. Lemma 3 implies that aiαφ → ∧
x∈Pr(φ)
aiαx is a theorem. From Axiom 5 we have
that aiαφ → kiαφ ∨ kiαaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem. Because kiαφ → aiαφ is a theorem and from
Axiom 4, we have that kiαφ →
∨
Pr(φ)⊆β⊆α
kiαk
i
βφ is a theorem. From Axioms AA and A, we
have kiβφ → aiβφ and aiβφ → aiPr(φ)φ. From Implication and from RK-Inference we have
that kiαk
i
βφ → kiαaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem. From Implication, kiαφ → kiαaiPr(φ)φ and therefore
aiαφ→ kiαaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem.
Lemma 6. If φ is a theorem and Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ X, then aiαφ→ kiαφ is a theorem.
Proof. If φ is a theorem then, because φ → (aiPr(φ)φ → φ) is an instance of a valid formula
of PC, by Modus Ponens aiPr(φ)φ→ φ is also a theorem. By RK-Inference, kiαaiPr(φ)φ→ kiαφ
is a theorem. From Lemma 5, aiαφ→ kiαaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem. It follows by Implication that
aiαφ→ kiαφ is a theorem.
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For every i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ωα, α ⊆ X, define a(ω, i) := {x ∈ X : aiαx ∈ ω}.
Lemma 7. For every ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I, ω ∩ La(ω,i) ∈ P i(ω).
Proof. See proof of Proposition 5 of HMS, where their Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 correspond
to Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 of the present paper, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 2. Nonemptiness follows from Lemma 7. For 0., by (ii) of the definition
of P i and Lemma 3 we have P i(ω) ⊆ Ωa(ω,i). Property 1. follows from Lemma 7.
For 2., let ω′ ∈ P i(ω) and ω ∈ Ωα. Lemma 3 and the maximality of ω imply that
∧
x∈α′
aiαx ∧
y∈α\α′
¬aiαy ∈ ω, where α′ = a(i, ω). We first show that P i(ω′) ⊆ P i(ω). Suppose
that ω′′ ∈ P i(ω′) and that kiαφ ∈ ω. From Axiom 4 and Lemma 4 we have kiαkiα′φ ∈ ω.
From the definition of P i we have kiα′φ ∈ ω′, where ω′ ∈ Ωα′ . Hence, φ ∈ ω′′. If aiαφ ∈ ω,
then from Lemma 5 we have kiαa
i
Pr(φ)φ ∈ ω, which implies aiPr(φ)φ ∈ ω′. Because Axiom
AA implies that aiPr(φ)φ → aiα′φ is a theorem, we have aiα′φ ∈ ω′ and therefore φ ∈ ω′′ or
¬φ ∈ ω′′. Conversely, (φ ∈ ω′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′′) implies aiα′φ ∈ ω′ and hence aiαaiα′φ ∈ ω. From
Lemma 3 aiαa
i
α′φ→ aiαφ is a theorem and hence aiαφ ∈ ω.
For the reverse inclusion, suppose that ω′′ ∈ P i(ω) and ω′ ∈ Ωα′ . If kiα′φ ∈ ω′ then
aiαk
i
α′φ ∈ ω and by Lemma 7, (kiα′φ ∈ ω or ¬kiα′φ ∈ ω). From Axioms PA1 and AA
we have aiα′¬kiα′φ ∈ ω. Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that ∧
x∈α′
aiαx ∈ ω. Axiom 5 implies that
aiα′¬kiα′φ∧¬kiα′φ ∧
x∈α′
aiαx→ kiα′¬kiα′φ is a theorem. If ¬kiα′φ ∈ ω then we have kiα′¬kiα′φ ∈ ω
and from Axiom KA and α′ ⊆ α we have kiα¬kiα′φ ∈ ω. But this implies that ¬kiα′φ ∈ ω′,
a contradiction to the consistency of ω′. Therefore, kiα′φ ∈ ω which, from KA, implies
kiαφ ∈ ω and hence φ ∈ ω′′. Next, aiα′φ ∈ ω′ implies aiαaiα′φ ∈ ω and therefore aiαφ ∈ ω and
(φ ∈ ω′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′′). Conversely, (φ ∈ ω′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′′) implies aiαφ ∈ ω. From Lemma 5,
aiαφ → kiαaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem. Therefore, kiαaiPr(φ)φ ∈ ω. But then, aiPr(φ)φ ∈ ω′ and from
AA, aiα′φ ∈ ω′.
For 3., let S = Ωα, S
′ = Ωβ, α ⊆ β. We first show that kiαφ ∈ ωS = ω ∩ Lα implies
φ ∈ ωS. Since kiαφ ∈ ω and kiαφ → kiβφ is a theorem and kiβφ ∈ Lβ, we have kiβφ ∈ ω and
hence φ ∈ ω. Because kiαφ is defined only if Pr(φ) ⊆ α, we have φ ∈ Lα and therefore
φ ∈ ωS = ω ∩ Lα.
Suppose now that aiαφ ∈ ωS. Then, aiαφ ∈ ω, which implies aiβφ ∈ ω and hence (φ ∈ ω
or ¬φ ∈ ω). Because Pr(φ) ⊆ α we have (φ ∈ ωS or ¬φ ∈ ωS). Conversely, suppose (φ ∈ ωS
or ¬φ ∈ ωS). Then, (φ ∈ ω or ¬φ ∈ ω) which implies aiβφ ∈ ω and as a result aiαφ ∈ ω.
Because Pr(aiαφ) ⊆ α we have aiαφ ∈ Lα and therefore aiαφ ∈ ωS. As a result, ωS ∈ P i(ωS).
For 4., let S = Ωα, ω ∈ S ′ = Ωβ and α ⊆ β. Suppose ω′ ∈ P i(ω) and set S ′′ = Ωa(ωS ,i).
We need to show that ω′S′′ ∈ P (ωS). Suppose kiαφ ∈ ω ∩ Lα = ωS. Because kiαφ → kiβφ is
a theorem and kiβφ ∈ Lβ, we have kiβφ ∈ ω and φ ∈ ω′. Moreover, from Axiom A we have
that kiαφ ∈ ωS implies aiαφ ∈ ωS. From Lemma 3 we have that Pr(φ) ⊆ La(ωs,i). Hence,
φ ∈ ω′ ∩ La(ωs,i) = ω′S′′ . Suppose aiαφ ∈ ωS. Then, Pr(φ) ⊆ La(ωs,i) and from Axiom AA we
have aiβφ ∈ ω. Therefore φ ∈ ω′S′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′S′′ . Conversely, suppose φ ∈ ω′S′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′S′′ .
Then, φ ∈ ω′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′, which implies aiβφ ∈ ω and from Axiom AA, aiαφ ∈ ωS.
Proof of Lemma 1. The first two claims are obvious. For the third claim, suppose that
ω ∈ [kiβφ]Ωα . This implies that kiβφ ∈ ω. We need to show that ω′ = {ω}Ωβ ∈ KiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ)),
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or that P i(ω′) ⊆ ([φ]ΩPr(φ))Ωi(ω′). First, by construction, kiβφ ∈ ω′ = ω ∩ Lβ. By the
definition of P i, ω′′ ∈ P i(ω′) ⊆ Ωi(ω′) implies φ ∈ ω′′. Hence, φ ∈ {ω′′}ΩPr(φ) = ω′′ ∩ LPr(φ),
{ω′′}ΩPr(φ) ∈ [φ]ΩPr(φ) and ω′′ ∈ ([φ]ΩPr(φ))Ωi(ω′).
For the other direction, suppose that ω ∈
(
KiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ))
)
Ωα
, so that ω′ = {ω}Ωβ ∈
KiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ)). Hence, P
i(ω′) ⊆ ([φ]Pr(φ))Ωi(ω′) ⊆ [φ]Ωi(ω′). Suppose that kiβφ /∈ ω′. Because
ω′ is maximally consistent in Lβ and kiβφ ∈ Lβ, we have ¬kiβφ ∈ ω′. From the definition of
P i, maximal consistency, Generalized Reflexivity and P i(ω′) ⊆ [φ]Ωi(ω′), we have aiβφ ∈ ω′.
From Lemma 5, aiβφ → kiβaiPr(φ)φ is a theorem. From Lemma 4, kiβaiPr(φ)φ ∈ ω′. Define
keni(ω′) := {ψ : kiβψ ∈ ω′}, which is closed under conjunctions. Then, aiPr(φ)φ ∈ keni(ω′).
Suppose that keni(ω′) ∪ {¬φ} is inconsistent. From Lemma 2, ψ → φ is a theorem, for
some ψ ∈ keni(ω′). Then, also ψ ∧ aiPr(φ)φ → φ is a theorem in the language of ω′. By
RK-Inference, kiβψ ∧ kiβaiPr(φ)φ → kiβφ is a theorem and hence kiβφ ∈ ω′, a contradiction
to the original hypothesis. Hence, keni(ω′) ∪ {¬φ} is consistent. This implies that we can
extend it to a maximally consistent ω′′ in the sub-language of the elements of P i(ω′). By the
definition of P i, we have ω′′ ∈ P i(ω′), contradicting that P i(ω′) ⊆ [φ]Ωi(ω′). Hence, kiβφ ∈ ω′
and therefore kiβφ ∈ ω.
For the last claim, suppose that ω ∈ [aiβφ]Ωα . This implies that aiβφ ∈ ω. We need
to show that ω′ = {ω}Ωβ ∈ AiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ)), or that P i(ω′)  [φ]ΩPr(φ) . By construction,
aiβφ ∈ ω′ = ω ∩ Lβ, which implies φ ∈ ω′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′′ for all ω′′ ∈ P i(ω′). Hence,
P i(ω′)  [φ]ΩPr(φ) . For the other direction, suppose that ω ∈
(
AiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ))
)
Ωα
, so that
ω′ = {ω}Ωβ ∈ AiΩβ([φ]ΩPr(φ)). Then, P i(ω′)  [φ]ΩPr(φ) , which implies that for all ω′′ ∈ P i(ω′),
φ ∈ ω′′ or ¬φ ∈ ω′′. By the definition of P i, aiβφ ∈ ω′. Therefore, aiβφ ∈ ω and ω ∈ [aiβφ]Ωα .
Theorem 2. Suppose E,F  S. Then,
1. Subjective Necessitation For all ω ∈ S, ω ∈ KS(Ω(ω)).
2. Generalized Monotonicity ES(E)∨S(F ) ⊆ FS(E)∨S(F ), F  E =⇒ KS(E) ⊆ KS(F ).
3. Conjunction KS(E) ∩KS(F ) = KS
(
ES(E)∨S(F ) ∩ FS(E)∨S(F )
)
.
4. The Axiom of Knowledge KS(E) ⊆ ES.
5. The Axiom of Transparency ω ∈ KS(E) ⇐⇒ ω ∈ KS(KΩ(ω)(E)).
6. The Axiom of Wisdom ω ∈ AS(E)∩¬KS(E) ⇐⇒ ω ∈ KS(AΩ(ω)(E)∩¬KΩ(ω)(E)).
7. Symmetry US(E) = US(¬E).
Proof. See Galanis [2007].
Lemma 8. If E  S  S ′, then (KiS(E))S′ ⊆ KiS′(E) and AiS′(E) = (AiS(E))S′.
Proof. Suppose ω ∈ (KiS(E))S′ . Then, ωS ∈ KiS(E), which implies that E  P i(ωS) and
P i(ωS) ⊆ EΩi(ωS). Projections Preserve Ignorance implies that E  P i(ωS)  P i(ω) and
16
P i(ω) ⊆ (P i(ωS))Ωi(ω) ⊆ EΩi(ω). Hence, ω ∈ KiS′(E). Moreover, (KiS(E))S′ ⊆ KiS′(E)
implies KiS(E) ⊆ (KiS′(E))S.
Suppose ω ∈ AiS′(E) and let E ⊆ S ′′. By Generalized Reflexivity and Stationarity,
{ω}Ωi(ω) ∈ P i({ω}Ωi(ω)). Because S ′′  Ωi(ω) = Ωi({ω}Ωi(ω)), Projections Preserve Aware-
ness implies that {ω}S′′ ∈ P i({ω}S′′). Hence, S ′′ = Ωi({ω}S′′). Because S ′′  S, Projections
Preserve Ignorance implies S ′′ = Ωi({ω}S′′)  Ωi({ω}S). Therefore, {ω}S ∈ AiS(E) and
ω ∈ (AiS(E))S′ . For the other direction, suppose that ω ∈ (AiS(E))S′ . Then, {ω}S ∈ AiS(E)
and S ′′  Ωi({ω}S). From Projections Preserve Ignorance, Ωi({ω}S)  Ωi(ω) and therefore
ω ∈ AiS′(E).
Lemma 9. Suppose that β ⊆ α ⊆ C(S), ω ∈ S and (Σ, ω) |= ∧
x∈β
aiαx ∧
y∈α\β
¬aiαy. Then, we
have that C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))) = β. Conversely, if β ⊆ C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))) and ∧
x∈β
aiαx is defined
at ω, then (Σ, ω) |= ∧
x∈β
aiαx.
Proof. Suppose (Σ, ω) |= ∧
x∈β
aiαx ∧
y∈α\β
¬aiαy. Then, there exists state space S ′ such that
C(S ′) = α. Moreover, we have that {ω}C−1(α) ∈
⋂
x∈β
(
AiC−1(α)(C
−1(x))
)
, which implies
{ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)(C−1(β)) and β ⊆ C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))).
Suppose that y ∈ C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))) and y /∈ β. Because Ωi({ω}C−1(α))  C−1(α) = S ′
and C(S ′) = α, we have y ∈ α. Then, {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)(C−1(y)) = AiC−1(α)([y]C−1(y))
which implies (Σ, ω) |= aiαy, a contradiction. Hence, C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))) = β.
For the other direction, suppose β ⊆ C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))), which implies that {ω}C−1(α) ∈
AiC−1(α)(C
−1(β)) ⊆ ⋂
x∈β
AiC−1(α)(C
−1(x)) =
⋂
x∈β
AiC−1(α)([x]C−1(x))). Therefore, (Σ, ω) |= ∧x∈βa
i
αx.
Lemma 10. Let Σ be an unawareness model. Then Γ |=Σ φ iff for all ω ∈ S∗, whenever φ
is defined at ω, we have that (Σ, ω) |= Γ implies (Σ, ω) |= φ.
Proof. The “only if” is straightforward. For the other direction, suppose that there exists a
state space S and a state ω ∈ S such that (Σ, ω) |= Γ and (Σ, ω) |= ¬φ. By the definition
of 7→ and |=, there exists ω∗ ∈ S such that ω∗S = ω, (Σ, ω∗) |= Γ and (Σ, ω∗) |= ¬φ, a
contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 2. This follows from Corollary 1, Proposition 2 and Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Following the approach of HMS, we prove soundness by showing that:
1. All axioms are valid formulas,
2. the set of valid formulas is closed under RK-Inference, and
3. that for every state in every unawareness model the set of formulas that are true in
that state is closed under Modus Ponens.
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For PC, it is clear that if φ is a substitution instance of a valid formula, then (Σ, ω) |= φ
for every unawareness model Σ and ω ∈ S∗. Using Lemma 10, φ is valid.
For Axiom T, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ, where ω ∈ S. Then, {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))),
which implies, by property 4 of Theorem 2 that {ω}C−1(α) ∈ ([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))C−1(α) ⊆ [φ]C−1(α).
Hence, we have ω ∈ [φ]S and (Σ, ω) |= φ.
For Axiom 4, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ ∧
x∈β
aiαx ∧
y∈α\β
¬aiαy. Then, {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))),
which implies, by property 5 of Theorem 2, that {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)KiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))).
From Lemma 9, we have C−1(β) = Ωi({ω}C−1(α)) andKiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) = [k
i
βφ]C−1(β).
Therefore, {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([kiβφ]C−1(β)) and (Σ, ω) |= kiαkiβφ.
For Axiom 5, suppose (Σ, ω) |= aiαφ ∧
x∈β
aiαx, which implies {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))).
By property 6 of Theorem 2, {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))
⋃
KiC−1(α)
(¬KiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))⋂
AiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))
)
. From the proof of Lemma 9 and (Σ, ω) |= ∧
x∈β
aiαx we have
C−1(β)  Ωi({ω}C−1(α)). From Lemma 8 we have that
¬KiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) ⊆
(
¬KiC−1(β)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))
)
Ωi({ω}C−1(α))
,
AiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) ⊆
(
AiC−1(β)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))
)
Ωi({ω}C−1(α))
.
From property 2 of Theorem 2 and the definition of Ki we have that
KiC−1(α)¬KiΩi({ω}C−1(α))([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) ⊆ K
i
C−1(α)¬KiC−1(β)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))
and similarly for the awareness operator. Combining, we have that (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ∨kiα(¬kiβφ∧
aiβφ).
The first propositional awareness axiom follows from property 7 of Theorem 2. For the
second propositional awareness Axiom, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= aiαφ ∧ aiαψ. This is equiv-
alent to having {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) ∩ AiC−1(α)([ψ]C−1(Pr(ψ))) = AiC−1(α)([φ ∧
ψ]C−1(Pr(φ)∪Pr(ψ))) and (Σ, ω) |= aiα(φ ∧ ψ).
For Axiom PA3, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= aiαkjβφ. Then, we have that {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)([kjβφ]C−1(β)),
which implies that {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)(C−1(β)). Hence, β ⊆ C(Ωi({ω}C−1(α))). Because
aiαk
j
βφ is defined at ω, so is ∧
x∈β
aiαx. From Lemma 9, (Σ, ω) |= ∧
x∈β
aiαx. For the other direction,
(Σ, ω) |= ∧
x∈β
aiαx implies that
{ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)(C−1(β)) = AiC−1(α)(KjC−1(β)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ)))).
Therefore (Σ, ω) |= aiαkjβφ. The logic is similar for Axiom PA4.
For Axiom A, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ. Then, we have that {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) ⊆
AiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) and (Σ, ω) |= aiαφ.
For Axiom AA, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= aiα′φ and Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′. Then, we have that
{ω}C−1(α′) ∈ AiC−1(α′)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))). Because C−1(Pr(φ))  C−1(α)  C−1(α′) and from
18
Lemma 8, we have {ω}C−1(α) ∈ AiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) and if (Σ, ω) 7→ aiαφ, then (Σ, ω) |= aiαφ.
The other direction is similar.
For Axiom KA, suppose that (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ and Pr(φ) ⊆ α ⊆ α′. Then, we have
that {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))). Because C−1(α)  C−1(α′), Lemma 8 implies that
{ω}C−1(α′) ∈ KiC−1(α′)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))) and if (Σ, ω) 7→ kiα′φ, then (Σ, ω) |= kiα′φ.
For the second claim, suppose that φ1, φ2, . . . , φn and φ are formulas such that Pr(φ) ⊆⋃n
i=1 Pr(φi) and that φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ φn → φ is a valid formula. We want to show that if⋃n
i=1 Pr(φi) ⊆ α then kiαφ1∧ kiαφ2∧ . . .∧ kiαφn → kiαφ is also valid. In particular, we need to
show that, for any unawareness model Σ and any ω ∈ S, if (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ1∧kiαφ2∧ . . .∧kiαφn
and (Σ, ω) 7→ kiαφ, then (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ. Suppose (Σ, ω) |= kiαφ1 ∧ kiαφ2 ∧ . . . ∧ kiαφn
and (Σ, ω) 7→ kiαφ, where ω ∈ S. Then, we have {ω}C−1(α) ∈ KiC−1(α)([φ1]C−1(Pr(φ1))) ∩
KiC−1(α)([φ2]C−1(Pr(φ2))) ∩ . . . ∩ KiC−1(α)([φn]C−1(Pr(φi))). From the definition of |= and prop-
erty 3 of Theorem 2 we have that KiC−1(α)([φ1]C−1(Pr(φ1))) ∩ KiC−1(α)([φ2]C−1(Pr(φ2))) ∩ . . . ∩
KiC−1(α)([φn]C−1(Pr(φi))) ⊆ KiC−1(α)([φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ φn]C−1(∪ni=1Pr(φi))).
Since φ1 ∧φ2 ∧ . . .∧φn → φ is defined at ω and it is valid, we have [φ1 ∧φ2 ∧ . . .∧φn]S ⊆
[φ]S. Because C
−1(∪ni=1Pr(φi))  S, we also have [φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ φn]C−1(∪ni=1Pr(φi)) ⊆
[φ]C−1(∪ni=1Pr(φi)). From property 2 of Theorem 2 and the definition ofK
i we haveKiC−1(α)([φ1∧
φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ φn]C−1(∪ni=1Pr(φi))) ⊆ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(∪ni=1Pr(φi))) ⊆ KiC−1(α)([φ]C−1(Pr(φ))). Hence,
(Σ, ω) |= kiαφ.
For the third claim, let Σ be an unawareness model, ω ∈ S ∈ S, (Σ, ω) |= φ and
(Σ, ω) |= φ→ ψ. We need to show that (Σ, ω) |= ψ. By the definition of an event, [φ]S, we
have that ω ∈ [φ]S and ω ∈ [ψ ∨ ¬φ]S ⊆ [ψ]S ∪ ¬[φ]S. Therefore, ω ∈ [ψ]S and (Σ, ω) |= ψ.
The proof of completeness is identical to that of HMS, using Corollary 2.
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